San Francisco Declaration, AI governance and the Board: who is overseeing the AI supply chain you depend on?
What is the San Francisco Declaration
On 15 November 2026, Australia and nine other countries signed the San Francisco Declaration on the Secure Foundations of Enduring Prosperity at the Pax Silica Founders Retreat in San Francisco. According to the Australian Government’s announcement, the declaration is a United States-led commitment to work together on the supply chains that underpin artificial intelligence: critical minerals, energy, semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, data centres, logistics, and the AI models themselves. The signatories are the United States, Australia, India, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Qatar, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom. [1][2]
Two points are relevant for boards. First, this is a political declaration, not a regulation. On the text published so far, it creates no legal obligation for Australian organisations. Second, it is nonetheless relevant for Australian organisations. In our opinion – when governments start treating AI supply chains as economic security infrastructure, follow-through in areas like procurement policy, export controls, investment screening and vendor ecosystems becomes more likely.
The direction is worth watching even though the timetable is unknown.
What Boards need to understand by “AI supply chain assurance”
Directors are generally familiar with supply chain risk for physical goods. AI supply chain assurance is the same discipline applied to a less visible stack. When your organisation deploys an AI system, you are not buying a single product. You are depending on a chain that typically includes:
- Compute and hardware: the advanced chips (and the minerals, energy and manufacturing behind them) that train and run models.
- Foundation models: the large models your vendors build on, often developed overseas and updated remotely, sometimes without notice.
- Data: training and tuning data of varying provenance, including data scraped, licensed or synthesised by third parties.
- Platforms and integrators: the cloud providers, software vendors and consultants who package AI into the product you actually use.
Supply chain assurance is the discipline of understanding that chain, testing its points of weakness, and being able to demonstrate that this has been done: where did this model come from, what is in it, who can change it, and what happens to your organisation if it is withdrawn, compromised or regulated away? Cyber security agencies now recommend artefacts such as an AI Bill of Materials (AIBOM) or a Software Bill of Materials for AI: a documented inventory of the models, datasets, components and dependencies inside an AI system, so that when a failure occurs or a vulnerability is disclosed, you can answer “are we affected?” quickly rather than after weeks of investigation. [6][10]
Why oversight of the AI supply chain is already a governance responsibility, not just a geopolitics story
Boards of AI deployers need not wait for new legislation. Frameworks that already exist point boards in this direction. Most are voluntary guidance rather than legal obligation, and we note this explicitly below:
- Australia’s Voluntary AI Safety Standard is voluntary, not legally binding. Its 10 guardrails apply to organisations throughout the AI supply chain. Guardrail 8 calls for transparency with other organisations across the chain about data, models and systems, and the standard includes procurement guidance so deployers can align suppliers through contracts. [4]
- The National AI Centre’s Guidance for AI Adoption (also guidance, not law) advises organisations to identify, document and communicate accountability for shared responsibility across the AI supply chain – model developers, system developers and deployers – and to assess risks arising from other parties in the chain. [5]
- ISO/IEC 42001 is the international AI management system standard. The standard’s Annex A covers third-party and customer relationships, including allocating responsibilities across the AI life cycle and managing suppliers in line with the organisation’s responsible AI approach. [7]
- The EU AI Act: Under Article 25, a deployer (or distributor, importer or other third party) takes on the legal obligations of a high-risk system’s provider if it puts its own name or trademark on the system, substantially modifies it, or changes its purpose so that it becomes high-risk. This applies only to AI within the Act’s scope, including AI used in the EU, and Annex III high-risk obligations apply from 2 December 2027. [8][11] Australian Boards with European exposure should ask whether management knows where the organisation sits in the chain.
- The AICD and UTS Human Technology Institute’s Director’s Guide to AI Governance frames boards as ultimately accountable for the adoption, implementation and outcomes of AI, including clear accountability mapping and sufficient board AI literacy. [9]
The San Francisco Declaration raises the stakes on each of these. In our opinion – if allied governments coordinate on trusted vendors, critical minerals and sensitive technology, the vendor and model choices available to Australian organisations may increasingly be shaped by geopolitics as well as price and performance. A deployer’s supply chain position can change quickly through commercial failure, cyber incident, export controls, or a vendor exiting a market. [1][3]
What Boards should ask of management
These are the assurances a Board can reasonably seek from management, who are responsible for carrying them out. They work within frameworks your organisation may already use. They are framed for deployers: organisations that buy and use AI rather than build it.
1. AI supply chain map
The Board should ask for a register of AI systems in use providing details on: the foundation model behind it, the vendor and integrator, the cloud and compute it runs on, and the countries involved at each layer.
You cannot assure what you have not mapped.
This also surfaces “shadow AI”: tools used by staff that fall outside procurement oversight. [5][9]
2. AI Bill of Materials for critical systems
For the AI systems that matter the most, the Board should expect management to request an AIBOM or equivalent from the vendor: the models, datasets, components and dependencies inside the system, with version and source. G7 Cybersecurity Working Group has published minimum elements for an AI SBOM, so there is an emerging benchmark to point vendors at. [6][10]
3. Extend vendor due diligence with AI-specific questions
Generic supplier assessments do not adequately address AI risk. The Board should ask whether the vendor’s assessments cover training data sources and rights, model evaluation and bias testing, security posture, whether your data is retained for further training, the vendor’s own upstream dependencies, and incident and vulnerability notification practices. Management should prefer models and vendors with genuine transparency about these points. [6]
4. AI system transparency and change control
AI systems change over time, often without the deployer’s involvement: models are retrained, components swapped, terms updated. The Board can ask management to ensure contracts require notice of material changes, disclosure of compromised components or vulnerabilities, flow-down of transparency obligations to the vendor’s own suppliers, and audit or information rights. The Voluntary AI Safety Standard’s procurement guidance is a practical checklist for this. [4][6]
5. Establish accountability across the AI supply-chain
For each significant AI system, management should record which party – developer, vendor, integrator, your organisation – is responsible for monitoring performance, human oversight, incidents and updates. Shared responsibility that is not documented is responsibility that no party holds. [5][7]
6. Manage concentration and exit risk
For each critical AI dependency, the Board should ask: what is our exposure if this vendor, model or compute supply is disrupted, whether by commercial failure, cyber incident, export control or geopolitical action? Where the exposure is material, management should consider diversification, contractual exit rights, data portability and tested fallbacks. The declaration’s focus on “reducing excessive dependencies” is, in our view, equally sound practice at organisational level. [3]
7. Verify provenance rather than assuming it
Management should maintain a model registry of specific versions that have been verified, tested and approved for use, re-verify before adopting new versions, use integrity checks where available, and treat web-sourced models and content as untrusted by default. [6]
8. Track the policy signal; the Board keeps watch. The San Francisco declaration is the beginning of a process, not the end. The Board can ask management to track the follow-through
Australian procurement guidance, export control changes, investment screening, and any move from voluntary frameworks toward mandatory expectations. Whether and when that shift happens is uncertain; our judgment is that voluntary frameworks often become expected practice over time, but that is an assessment, not a legal prediction. [1][2][4]
The bottom line for Boards
AI supply chain assurance sounds technical. At Board level it is a familiar governance question in a new domain: do we know what we depend on, who controls it, and what happens if it fails or is taken away?
It does confirm that the resilience and trustworthiness of AI supply chains is now a stated priority for the governments. Boards that ask this question now, and hold management to clear answers, will be better prepared for whatever follow-through comes, and better protected against failures that will not wait for regulation.
General governance information, not legal advice. Sources checked at the time of publication and are subject to change.
References
ABC News, “Australia signs US-led AI supply chain agreement amid growing contest with China”, 17 November 2026. https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-11-17/australia-signs-us-led-ai-supply-chain-agreement/107392252
Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources, “Australia signs San Francisco Declaration to secure technology supply chains”, 17 November 2026. https://www.industry.gov.au/news/australia-signs-san-francisco-declaration-secure-technology-supply-chains
United States Department of State, “Pax Silica” (initiative overview and declaration text). https://www.state.gov/pax-silica
Australian Government Department of Industry, Science and Resources, “Voluntary AI Safety Standard” (voluntary guardrails, including guardrail 8 on supply chain transparency, and procurement guidance). https://www.industry.gov.au/publications/voluntary-ai-safety-standard
National AI Centre, “Guidance for AI adoption: implementation guidance” (sections 1.2 Supply chain accountabilities, 3.1.2, 4.3 Supply chain transparency). https://www.ai.gov.au/staying-safe-and-responsible/essential-ai-practices/guidance-ai-adoption-implementation-guidance
New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre, “Artificial intelligence and machine learning: Supply chain risks and mitigations”. https://www.ncsc.govt.nz/assets/guidance/Documents/Artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning-Supply-chain-risks-and-mitigations.pdf
ISO/IEC 42001:2023, Information technology – Artificial intelligence – Management system (ISO, standard metadata: https://www.iso.org/standard/81230.html). The standard text is paywalled and was not reviewed directly; descriptions of its Annex A third-party and supplier controls rely on published secondary implementation guidance consulted on 18 November 2026: isomanaged.com, “ISO 42001 Annex A.10: Third-party and customer relationships” (https://isomanaged.com/knowledge-base/iso-standards/iso-42001/iso-42001-annex-a-controls/iso-42001-annex-a-10-third-party-and-customer-relationships) and compliance.manzill.com, “A.10.3 Suppliers” (https://compliance.manzill.com/iso-iec-42001-2023/a.10.3/third-party-and-customer-relationships/suppliers/).
European Commission AI Act Service Desk, “Article 25: Responsibilities along the AI value chain”, Regulation (EU) 2024/1689. https://ai-act-service-desk.ec.europa.eu/en/ai-act/article-25
AICD and UTS Human Technology Institute, “A Director’s Guide to AI Governance”, Version 2, June 2026. https://www.aicd.com.au/news-media/research-and-reports/a-directors-guide-to-ai-governance.html
German Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) for the G7 Cybersecurity Working Group, “Software Bill of Materials for AI – minimum elements”. https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/KI/SBOM-for-AI_minimum-elements.pdf
European Commission, “AI Omnibus enters into force” (27 July 2026; high-risk obligations under Annex III apply from 2 December 2027, Annex I embedded systems from 2 August 2028). https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/news/ai-omnibus-enters-force